We live in a world in which denial of anthropogenic climate change, a phenomenon whose existence and form has been agreed upon by nearly the entirety of the scientific community, is not at all restricted to a handful of conspiracy theorists or anti-science zealots. This denial is institutionalized, and it has been for years. Such denial manifests itself in de facto bans throughout the United States’ Office of International Climate and Clean Energy on the inclusion of phrases such as "climate change," "emissions reduction," or "Paris Agreement" in written communication, since March, 2017 (Wolff). Such informal censorship is not wholly uncommon within American spheres of government. Beginning in March, 2015, officials in the Florida Department of Environmental Protection have halted use of “climate change” and “global warming,” citing directives that such controversial terminology is best avoided altogether (McCoy). However, censorship is certainly not the only institutional practice ignoring the real and contemporary ramifications of global warming: The government of North Carolina—whose populace will likely face a regional sea-level rise to the tune of 39 inches over the 21st century—since the passage into law of House Bill 819 in 2012, interdicts any usage of scientific predictions on sea-level changes in its coastal zoning policies (Harish). Legislation of this sort often yields dramatic consequences, as Don Barber makes clear: Coastal development, particularly in flood zones, can be devastating, and has been a significant cause of increased property damage over the course of the past several decades, in the wake of more frequently intense tropical storms and hurricanes. Universally and unambiguously, this willful ignorance of such a scientifically confirmed reality is deadly.
The contemporary circumstances surrounding climate change denial would likely appall any dedicated follower of Ulrich Beck, Gernot Wagner, or Martin L. Weitzman, with fair justification. According to Beck, the rise of the modern age of technological usage, and the negative externalities upon the environment that have come with it, has rung in a new socioeconomic structure based on risk, with distinctions stronger and more defined than those of the class society (35). In this brave new world, we attempt to shy away from the “hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself” (italics retracted) (21). As such, our standard conception of risk—that it is absent unless otherwise noted—is no longer valid (34), given that a shift from calmness to “irreversible affliction” may occur instantaneously, without anyone’s knowledge until it is already far too late (40). Indeed, he contends that our whole capitalist system has shifted from a force for everyone to strive for goodness to one of everyone praying for continued life and sustenance, all without poison (49). Such a theory is dramatic, but not yet uncalled for, as global temperatures continue to rise, year after year, with minimal exceptions, and the devastation of higher concentrations of hurricanes and tropical storms becomes all-the-more present in quotidian American life (Global Warming and Hurricanes). This is where Wagner and Weitzman take hold. They argue that if people insure their houses and vehicles for fires, theft, and crashes, when the likelihood of such incidents is typically far lower than that of catastrophe brought on by anthropogenic climate change, there is no justifiable economic reason to avoid similar, if not greater, precautions for an onslaught of natural disasters in the years to come (55). The burden of proof necessary, in this case, they argue, must be brought on by those who argue against preparing for these catastrophes and ensuring the continued existence of technological infrastructure in the long-term, because the consequences of actually believing them is just so grave (76). There is compelling evidence from a wide array of academic fields, only briefly demonstrated by the above authors, encouraging us not only to accept anthropogenic climate change as a reality in our conversations and our governmental work, but to act speedily in every sector to ensure the continued survival of our species and its infrastructure. And yet, given these factors, a whopping 32 percent of Americans identify as “Disengaged,” “Doubtful,” or “Dismissive” about global warming as a whole (Hoffman). With this social disparity in mind, I contend that, whereas Beck, Wagner, and Weitzman leverage high-level philosophical and scientific explanations of both the contemporary world’s economic and structural transition in the face of global warming and contemporary solutions toward bringing forth a social consensus against perpetuating anthropogenic climate change, they fail in a matter of accessibility for wide arrays of audiences, which might key into the American public’s general inaction and ambivalence in this field. However, acknowledging a modern world in which shifts to sustainable technology are seen as polarizing and controversial—and often followed by mass inaction—Andrew J. Hoffman’s tactics of forging individualized, consensus-based paths toward more ecologically conscious development may be most successful in bringing forth such change.
Hoffman bases his individualized strategies toward social consensus on a sociocultural factor of contemporary life called “motivated reasoning” (16), in which people filter the boundless information in conversational play more so by how that information fits in with their political and cultural identities than by its actual inherent justifications (4). This is because our personal cultural values often lend a particular understanding of “how the world works, how it ought to work, and how we behave within it” (5). Thus, in order to reach those who avoid the subject of climate change, he claims that we must meet them where they are; his theory of change rests in joining the ideological tribe of those with whom we discuss such critical and contentious problems (6). To his credit, Matthew Nisbet argues that “messages need to be tailored to a specific medium and audience, using carefully researched metaphors, allusions, and examples that trigger a new way of thinking about the personal relevance of climate change” (15). To those who evade terminology connoting sustainable development, one might emphasize “American know-how” and our national history of innovation, rendering a green future full of “meaning, security, prosperity, and happiness” for us, our children, and our grandchildren (Hoffman 64). And by pointing to the “radical flank” (italics retracted) of environmentalists (83), one can demonstrate how easy and simple it is to live sustainably, while pointing to fierce climate justice advocates by acknowledging that we don’t need to live as extreme a lifestyle in order to forge a tangible impact into our world’s future (84). While its justifications may be long-worded or complex, conversational consensus is not rocket science. It’s a matter of meeting people where they are, and fostering a positive relationship, before bringing in any controversy to sour the moment.
In the modern world, this methodology may become a useful tool for the typical climate advocate, but its lessons are not all necessarily positive. Because anthropogenic climate change has become a topic of such controversy, bringing in news and studies about it often lead to stronger polarization, as even the most educated about the issue are typically, according to work by Braman et al, the most polarized in their beliefs (2). It’s also understandable for people less well versed in climate politics to feel thrown off or affronted by mentions of studies that make them feel scientifically illiterate or uninformed, or at least judged as such. Rattling off scientific studies as if they are commonplace can be patronizing, and it may lead to such frustration that people ban mention of them altogether, classifying them more as a faux pas than anything else—hence, the aforementioned de facto phrase-bans. If such pro-sustainability tactics bring forth enough frustration that people halt conversation of the issue itself, it might be worth finding new ones. However, any insistence on positive language revolving around an inherently American ideal of technological development and a nationally encouraged perpetual pursuit of knowledge—regardless of its actual verity—may not always be helpful either, depending on the demographic of the listener. Positive reinforcement is really only one of many techniques toward encouraging behavior. Indeed, such rhetoric discounts the potential value, for certain circumstances, of scare tactics, however they cheap they may be, in curtailing disagreement and in attracting an emotionally vulnerable political powerhouse. However, with a renewed emphasis on precise topics, phrases, and metaphors that strengthen both the listener’s perceived autonomy and her conscious understanding of the ramifications of her behavior on the environment, as Arielle Balbus suggests (13), the actual content of the message could be variable and entirely dependant on the relationship between the speaker and the listener. Indeed, Krantz et al write that one’s emotional connections to those affected by climate atrocities—a symbolic relationship likely created and strengthened in dialogue with advocates—motivate “action in ways not provided by an analytic understanding” (47). Be that conversation exhilarating or heartrending, if it pushes people to action, Hoffman’s theory of change would likely label it as sufficient.
Clearly, Beck, Wagner, and Weitzman’s work concerns dramatic problems of the contemporary world that are, without any doubt, horrifying. A population’s survival by risks, and its nearsighted and ignorant mismanagement of them, could never be desirable. And yet, Risk Society and Climate Shock probably aren’t the perfect books to lend a local climate-change denier. Such a character might very well laugh off their citations and accompanying studies, because of a simple reality demonstrated in Hoffman’s writings: Perhaps equally important to the message itself, for an advocate, is her timing and tact, given an already substantial relationship to others in her political sphere. Thus, by tailoring the message to the listener’s own political ideologies and cultural identities, advocates may progress in fostering a social consensus on an issue whose scientific reasoning is already clear—and maybe enjoy a stress-free Thanksgiving, as well.
Works Cited
Balbus, Arielle. Increasing public understanding of climate risks and choices: Learning from social science research and practice. Ann Arbor, MI: Erb Institute/Union of Concerned Scientists, 2016. Print.
Barber, Don. “Energy, Resources, and Sustainability.” GEOL.B206.001.F17. Energy, Resources, and Sustainability, 14 Sept. 2017, Bryn Mawr, Bryn Mawr College.
Beck, Ulrich. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. N.p.: Sage, 1986. Print.
Braman, Donald, Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, and Gregory N. Mandel. “The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks.” Nature Climate Change, 2012. 210: 732-35. Print.
Harish, Alon. “New Law in North Carolina Bans Latest Scientific Predictions of Sea-Level Rise.” ABC News, ABC News Network, 2 Aug. 2012, abcnews.go.com/US/north-carolina-bans-latest-science-rising-sea-level/story?id=16913782.
Hoffman, Andrew J. How Culture Shapes the Climate Change Debate. N.p.: Stanford Briefs, an Imprint of Stanford UP, 2015. Print.
Global Warming and Hurricanes. Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, 2017, Global Warming and Hurricanes, www.gfdl.noaa.gov/global-warming-and-hurricanes/.
Krantz, David H., Anthony Leiserowitz, Benjamin S. Orlove, Sabine Marx, Jennifer Phillips, Carla Roncoli, and Elke U. Weber. “Communication and mental processes: Experimental and analytic processing of uncertain climate information.” Global Environmental Change, 2006. 17:47-58. Print.
McCoy, Terrence. “Threatened by Climate Change, Florida Reportedly Bans Term ‘Climate Change.’” The Washington Post, WP Company, 9 Mar. 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/03/09/florida-state-most-affected-by-climate-change-reportedly-bans-term-climate-change/.
Nisbet, Matthew. “Communicating climate change: Why frames matter for public engagement.” Environment, 2009. 51(2): 12-23. Print.
Wagner, Gernot, and Martin L. Weitzman. Climate Shock: The Economic Consequences of a Hotter Planet. N.p.: Princeton UP, 2015. Print.
Wolff, Eric. “Energy Department Climate Office Bans Use of Phrase ‘Climate Change.’” POLITICO, POLITICO LLC, 29 Mar. 2017, www.politico.com/story/2017/03/energy-department-climate-change-phrases-banned-236655.
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