In his introduction to Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill claims that while Immanuel Kant attempts to develop an ethical calculus that does not measure an action’s worth by its consequences, Kant is ultimately a consequentialist. Mill writes that Kant fails to identify “any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility,” in an action’s universal adoption (8). Instead, Kant only clarifies between actions whose universal adoption “would be such as no one would choose to incur,” and ones that wouldn’t have such an effect (8). Separating acts into these two categories still requires considering their consequences, which is why Mill implicitly calls Kant a consequentialist—a title Kant would have never given himself. I believe, however, that Mill’s reading of Kant is incorrect. Situational contexts and consequences are at the core of Mill’s ethics and wholly irellevant to Kant’s. Because Mill is clearly consequentialist, I will demonstrate how Mill and Kant’s philosophies are incompatible, to refute Mill’s claim that Kant is also consequentialist. I will further demonstrate that, given Kant’s complete exclusion of situational contexts and consequences, it would be wholly inaccurate to call him a consequentialist, on account of the following justifications: Firstly, because Kant values ethical certainty, he cannot consider a given action’s consequences, since it is impossible to fully determine them. Secondly, because happiness is indeterminate, with unknown causes, an ethical calculus based in promoting happiness cannot yield moral certainty. Finally, because Kant strives for ethical calculus which precludes the situational corruption of actors, it must be determined a priori and in the abstract, for clear and precise behavioral guidance in all situations, which is impossible when considering situational contexts and consequences.
To provide consistent conclusions, Kant’s ethical calculus cannot include situational contexts and consequences, as they are not fully determinate. This is a critical difference between Kant and Mill: Despite Kant’s ignorance of situational consequences and contexts, Mill highly values them when choosing the action that will hopefully instigate the greatest possible happiness. By considering the hypothetical ramifications of an action’s universal adoption, Kant surely reconciles the consequences of potential choices. This is why Mill claims that Kant emphasizes all of humanity’s interests when determining an action’s moral worth (51). And yet, such consideration is entirely hypothetical. Kant’s ethics are in the abstract, wholly divorced from any particular situation, since it is impossible to know all of any one act’s consequences. Moreover, because his ethics are primarily intended to impact future choices, they do not include empirical considerations, since those would come far too late (3). And yet, Kant praises human experience for sharpening an actor’s “power of judgment” (5). This is because people need a basic understanding of actions and consequences to determine which actions could successfully be universally adopted. We need to know what murder is, for example, in order to rule it out as unethical. This is why Kant writes that “all morality” needs “anthropology for its application to human beings” (28-29). However, a successful moral framework must be based in reason, rather than anthropology or empiricism (29). Hence, knowing not to murder is not equivalent to developing an ethics. Instead, it is by reasoning—that if everyone were to murder, then humanity would cease to exist, so no one ought to murder anyone—that we know how to behave (5). Thus, Kant includes consequences in his ethics, but solely hypothetically, to determine whether an action can be successfully universalized. In its exclusion of situational factors, his ethics yield a strong and valuable sense of certainty (20). In contrast, Millian utilitarianism fails a Kantian litmus test because of its basis in situational consequences, which can be variable and unpredictable and lead to uncertain ends.
Because Mill’s ethical framework is rooted in promoting happiness, Kantian ethics are incompatible, given that happiness is indeterminate and, as an external basis for ethics, cannot yield any certainty. Mill claims that “the root of all morality” is happiness (7). As follows, actions that bring forth happiness or reduce pain are more ethical than actions that do not (10). He further acknowledges that utilitarian thinkers have typically prioritized mental pleasures over physical ones (11). However, he only provides speculative, anecdotal evidence to prove this (11-13), so this ranking’s legitimacy is questionable. Even still, he writes that people often opt for “the nearer good,” even when it will bring them less joy (13). Mill attributes this behavior to individual, as opposed to structural, failures, by depicting irrational agents as “from infirmity of character” (13). By contrast, Kant asserts that this irrational behavior is inherent in the very quest for happiness. Kant calls happiness “indeterminate,” so people cannot know its causes (34). Therefore, even though people seek happiness by “natural necessity” (32), it cannot be the basis of his ethics (35). Rather than striving for happiness as an external goal, Kant suggests following “empirical counsels,” such as “diet, frugality, politeness, [and] restraint” (35). These counsels are not end-goals for an action, as Mill sees happiness, given that Kant’s categorical imperative inherently precludes secondary goals. Instead, they offer guidance to help determine whether an action could successfully be universalized. Unlike utilitarianism, Kantian ethics have no external basis, leaving little room for miscalculation.
Kant’s ethics are also importantly a priori, so that they provide clear and precise ethical instructions before any action, to minimize individual situational corruption. Kant’s first categorical imperative illustrates this no-exceptions, no-excuses modus operandi: “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (italics retracted) (37). As the imperative demands, every single action must be considered apart from its situational contexts. Thus, an action’s moral worth is constant, regardless of both its agent and its particular consequences. For example, to Kant, lying is always unethical, even if the liar is typically benevolent (47). This is where Mill’s critique of Kant—that Kant is, unbeknownst to himself, a consequentialist—is so important: Suppose that someone were to behave as a utilitarian, with the belief that everyone else should do the same. This would supposedly follow Kant’s ideals, because Kant values successful universalizability. However, utilitarianism requires situationally based calculations, which means that an action’s moral worth can change, depending on the circumstance (61). This, for Kant, would be wholly unacceptable. Kant contends that an ethical calculus which values actions depending on the situational consequences can easily corrupt the actor (5). Indeed, it presents a conflict of interest: The actor must judge her action’s moral worth while potentially benefiting from her choice (5-6). Thus, for the sake of fostering an ethical calculus that doesn’t lead its actors to corruption, Kant rejects any consideration of situational contexts and consequences—crucial elements of Millian utilitarianism—in favor of an a priori ethical framework.
While Mill entertains the idea that Kant is just as much of a consequentialist as he is, I contend that such a reading of Kant is incorrect. Kant certainly considers actions’ consequences, and he values the human experience that familiarize people with them. However, this knowledge is largely definitional, and it is solely intended to consider the hypothetical case of universal adoption. Kant finds no legitimate basis for a cost/benefit analysis of situational consequences, and he wishes to avoid conflicts of interest using an a priori framework. Therefore, he cannot justifiably consider situational contexts and consequences, which are at the heart of Millian utilitarianism. Thus, to argue that Kantian ethics are consequentialist is to muddy the very definition of consequentialism, which is inextricably tied to situational consequences. While the work of John Stuart Mill will long remain one of the landmarks in the history of philosophical speculation, one cannot credibly label Immanuel Kant as a consequentialist.
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