Kant, Mill, and Animal Agriculture

The ethical methodologies of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill are typically perceived as in utter opposition to one another, on account of how they evaluate consequences. Kant’s ethics are rooted in a hypothetical consideration of an action’s successful universal applicability, without any situational considerations. In contrast, Mill’s moral judgment is based in a cost-benefit analysis of the potential situational consequences that may arise from a particular action. While this difference may often promote unique moral evaluations, their ethical methodologies likely lead to a similar conclusion about the ethical response to animal agriculture. I contend that, while Kant and Mill would evaluate animal agriculture with different considerations and calculations, they would both argue that consuming flesh is wholly unethical, given the modern empirical research about its unavoidable, disastrous consequences. In this paper, I will explain each philosopher’s ethical framework. I will then enumerate some of the direct and inevitable consequences of animal husbandry and justify their consideration in each moral system. Finally, I will conclude by arguing that sustainable eating must preclude animal consumption.

Situationalism and Consequentialism in Kant and Mill

In his introduction to Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill claims that while Immanuel Kant attempts to develop an ethical calculus that does not measure an action’s worth by its consequences, Kant is ultimately a consequentialist. Mill writes that Kant fails to identify “any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility,” in an action’s universal adoption (8). Instead, Kant only clarifies between actions whose universal adoption “would be such as no one would choose to incur,” and ones that wouldn’t have such an effect (8). Separating acts into these two categories still requires considering their consequences, which is why Mill implicitly calls Kant a consequentialist—a title Kant would have never given himself. I believe, however, that Mill’s reading of Kant is incorrect. Situational contexts and consequences are at the core of Mill’s ethics and wholly irellevant to Kant’s. Because Mill is clearly consequentialist, I will demonstrate how Mill and Kant’s philosophies are incompatible, to refute Mill’s claim that Kant is also consequentialist. I will further demonstrate that, given Kant’s complete exclusion of situational contexts and consequences, it would be wholly inaccurate to call him a consequentialist, on account of the following justifications: Firstly, because Kant values ethical certainty, he cannot consider a given action’s consequences, since it is impossible to fully determine them. Secondly, because happiness is indeterminate, with unknown causes, an ethical calculus based in promoting happiness cannot yield moral certainty. Finally, because Kant strives for ethical calculus which precludes the situational corruption of actors, it must be determined a priori and in the abstract, for clear and precise behavioral guidance in all situations, which is impossible when considering situational contexts and consequences.

Justice, Temperance, and Unearned Income

In Aristotle’s Politics and Nicomachean Ethics, he details the roles of currency and exchange in the Greek commercial economy of his time, while exploring the virtues necessary to live a good life. He explores their intersections—how people’s financial responsibilities are rooted in virtues, and vice versa. One must keep in mind, however, that his analysis is contemporary to a commercial state with fundamentally different economic circumstances, when compared to the modern, complex, global, capitalist economy. Thus, his ideations are impacted by different constraints: Aristotle did not, for example, factor in the ethical ramifications of stock exchanges, as those just didn’t exist in the fourth century before Jesus Christ. So, the repercussions of his conclusions about wealth acquisition and usury may also be different when considering the modern economy. Thus, in today’s world, a reasonable, intensive planning of one’s own wealth acquisition may not necessarily be detestable, from an Aristotelian perspective. Indeed, saving and investing one’s excess income may lead to capital gains that would allow one more financial resources to effect positive social change. However, such behavior only works with a disciplined attempt at temperance and material satiability.

On the Democratic Value of a Supposedly Egalitarian Experience

To Daniel Boorstein, we face an era of advancement like no other, comparable only in name to the renaissance, featuring an updated epithet: Rather than the “Republic of Letters,” whose citizens shared knowledge, we wake up to creation’s next revelation, the “Republic of Technology” (3). Following from this change, he argues that such an epoch is “not only more democratic, but also more in the American mode” (3) touting universal opportunity for entrance and engagement as its most critical feature. And yet, to Boorstein, those two supposed values of early America are in absence of a third, crucial to the new Republic: a “shared experience,” the foremost enabler of total democracy (3). And yet, whereas Boorstein’s contention that the Republic of Technology will ultimately yield a wholly democratic experience for the United States—if not the whole world—based on the egalitarian nature of technological advances that often make imprints across the entire national community, he fails to acknowledge the potentially catastrophic repercussions of the social forces leveraging that very technology. In prizing universal knowledge, the real and dramatic possibility of manipulation by higher forces is left untouched. As such, while the Republic of Technology may lead to a future of similar, comparable lifestyles for people across the nation, their experiences might be trodden upon by a misuse of power on the side of the informants, who hold the value of communal democracy in their very hands.

Comparing Germany and France’s Transitions to Renewable Energy

Summary

Germany and France’s transitions to renewable energy have been vastly different over the past few decades. To understand why this has been the case, I first clarify their dramatic similarities in GDP, electricity cost and usage, and household size, to illuminate their similar needs in infrastructure and electricity. Then, I refute three possible explanations for the difference in their energy transition, regarding their access to renewable resources, nuclear energy technology, and fossil fuel imports. I conclude by arguing that such a difference in their transitions is likely external to the above variables.